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In Germany, as in many other countries, research coexists with teaching at 
universities.1 Both tasks are, moreover, only situationally differentiated. There 
are only few roles or organizational subunits specializing in just one of these 
tasks. Professors in particular have to devote their attention to both tasks, 
which often leads to conflicting demands on their time budgets. In addition, 
most of the financial and personnel resources of German universities are shared 
by research and teaching as a common pool. Less than one fifth of the 
universities’ resources are separately budgeted funds for research projects, 
while more than four fifths are general university funds from government 
which do not specify separate budgetary categories for each of the two tasks.2 
This common pool o f  resources for teaching and research establishes a zero- 
sum relationship between teaching and research. Since to the general public,
This contribution sketches some main results from my extensive study of the resource prob-
lems of university research in West Germany since the mid-1970s; see Schimank (1993) for 
an extensive presentation. In addition to consulting other data sources, I conducted a survey 
of a representative sample of professors, asking them about some important aspects of their 
research conditions. The results, parts of which are used here, are described in Schimank 
(1992). I also carried out extensive unstructured interviews with about 30 professors from 
different academic fields who conducted more than the average amount of research, and with 
officials from the relevant government agencies and the organizations which politically repre-
sented the interests of universities. Findings from these interviews are also used here. To 
protect the anonymity of my interviewees, they are cited only by the number of the respective 
interview.
1 See Braun/ Schimank (1992) for a theoretical conceptualization of the following.
2 This rough calculation is based on data for the mid-1980s in Wissenschaftsrat (1988: 
234). No significant changes have occurred since then.
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especially students and their parents, to important interest groups like business 
associations and labor unions, and to politicians alike teaching usually is the 
much more important task of the universities, this zero-sum relationship im-
plies structurally built-in resource trouble for research. When the amount of 
general university funds required for teaching increases faster than the funds 
themselves, the share allocated to research diminishes correspondingly.
Since the beginning of the last century when German universities adopted 
research as their second task besides teaching, this kind of trouble arose re-
peatedly in German university research. The last time it started was in the 
mid-1970s. I will focus here on the period from the mid-1970s until the end 
of the 1980s, although the trouble is still going on. From 1975 to 1989, the 
number of students at German universities increased by two thirds. Even if 
one allows for the fact that the demand for teaching did not grow to quite 
the same extent, the universities had to bear a huge increase in this demand, 
while the established posts for personnel and the institutional funding stag-
nated.3 As a common pool of resources for teaching and research, these gen-
eral university funds for personnel and finances were consumed more exten-
sively by teaching, with shrinking leftovers for research.4 5This is corroborat-
ed by the professors’ appraisal of their resource situation. About 40% of the 
professors estimated in 1990/91 that their general funds had worsened with 
regard to research during recent years (Schimank 1992: 23-26).
Compensating these losses by falling back on separately budgeted funds 
became more difficult, too. The total amount of separately budgeted funds 
to the universities grew from 1975 to 1986 by about one third. In one of 
the German states, North Rhine-Westphalia, separately budgeted funds in-
creased by nearly three quarters between 1982 and 1990.6 Nevertheless, sepa-
rately budgeted funds did not suffice. Thus, on the one hand professors de-
pended increasingly upon separately budgeted funds. Actually, between 1988
3 See the data in Wissenschaftsrat (1988: 234), BMBW (1990: 139, 260; 1991: 218). 
Financial increases during these years were only effects of inflation.
4 This was corroborated by my unstructured interviews with professors. Some of them 
even had to admit that they had to use practically all of the general funds allocated to 
them -  the financial assignments for themselves and their assistants as well as their 
assistants’ work capacity -  for teaching (interviews 20, 21, 40).
5 My own calculations on the basis of deflated data from DFG (1975: 271); Wissenschafts-
rat (1988: 234-239); BMFT (1990: 340-341).
6 My own calculations, based on deflated data from MWF (1992: 20).
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and 1990, nine out of ten professors had to rely on some amount of separately 
budgeted funds (Schimank 1992: 26-27). On the other hand, these funds ex-
panded much more slowly than the demand for them. This applies especially 
to the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), the most important funding 
agency for universities, which had been able to grant about two thirds of the 
total sum applied for in 1975 but could grant only half in 1988 (DFG 1975: 
64, 195; 1989: 21).
On first sight, it seems plausible that an increasing demand for teaching 
not only consumes resources but also working time formerly available for 
research; if this reduces the amount of resources needed for research, the 
resource trouble for research might be significantly reduced. Indeed, most 
professors had to come to terms with a considerably higher teaching load. 
But, at first sight surprisingly, the common notion in political debates about 
German universities that professors could devote less and less time to research 
was not true. On the contrary, while research on average made up 23% of 
their working time budget in 1976/77, it increased to 28% in 1990/91 (Schi-
mank 1992: 16-17). Evidently, the professors succeeded in neutralizing the 
time pressure of an increasing teaching load by reducing the quality of teach-
ing, standardizing teaching, standardizing examinations and making them 
easier, informally delegating teaching duties to assistants, and sometimes cou-
pling teaching and research activities more tightly.7 Actually, on the average 
professors even gained a little more time for their research activities. If many 
professors had been prevented from doing as much research as before by their 
increased teaching load, the resource troubles for those who still had been 
able to do research would have been less because there would not have been 
that much demand for separately budgeted funds. Things being as they were, 
however, almost everybody continued to need resources for research.
This small selection of indications of the resource troubles of German 
university research must suffice here. Each point could be described in more 
detail and documented with more empirical proof, especially with regard to 
differences between various academic fields; further empirical indicators could 
be added. But, essentially, the overall picture would not change. Thus, for 
more than fifteen years German professors had to cope with gradually increas-
ing resource trouble affecting their research conditions. I will describe and
7 Findings from my unstructured interviews with professors illustrate all of these practices 
abundantly.
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explain the unsatisfactory, but unchanging pattern of coping activities exhibit-
ed during that time as a three-level actor constellation. The three levels of 
action are: uncoordinated reactions of individual professors who each tried 
to make the best for themselves out of their own particular troublesome situa-
tion; collective decisions about the distribution of general university funds 
within universities, especially on the faculty level; and the interplay between 
government actors and certain corporate actors who represented the interests 
of the universities in the political arena. As I will show, action on the level 
of collective decisions within universities was decisive for what was possible 
on the political level; and both levels of action determined what happened 
on the level of individual reactions to trouble.
1 Nonredistributive Intrauniversity Allocation of General 
University Funds
It is certainly not entirely absurd to expect that, as resources for research from 
the general university funds declined, the yearly allocation of these resources 
within the university, especially on the faculty level, might have been affected. 
Several criteria for a redistribution of resources might have been considered. 
The professors with a high intrascientific reputation for outstanding research 
could have been especially favored, exempting them as much as possible from 
unavoidable sacrifices of resources. These sacrifices, instead, could have been 
demanded from those professors with a low research productivity. Or profes-
sors who did research in fields of high importance to extrascientific users of 
research results could have been spared from inordinate resource losses. Or 
older professors who had accumulated a rather large resource base over the 
years and, perhaps, were not doing that much research anymore, could have 
been forced to relinquish some of their resources. Younger professors, on the 
other hand, whose productivity was at its peak level but whose resource base 
was comparatively small could, for example, have been excluded from resource 
losses. These and other imaginable criteria for the preferential treatment of 
certain professors, of course, could have been combined if the need for a more 
complex appraisal became evident. The criteria also could have been softened 
so that the degree of redistribution could be determined according to what 
seemed to be reasonable.
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As these brief remarks indicate, there are various potential good reasons 
to react to an increasing scarcity of resources for research with a redistribution 
of general university funds within the university. Moreover, redistribution very 
well could have been designed in a way which would not have brought about 
unbearable individual losses of resources and an intolerable increase of re-
source inequality among professors. But, in fact, almost nothing of this kind 
happened in German universities. The intrauniversity allocation of the general 
university funds did not redistribute resources according to any of the possible 
criteria mentioned. Instead, significant losses of resources as well as small 
intermediate or local gains were most often distributed proportionally accord-
ing to the share of resources each professor had at the time of the respective 
decisions.
To understand this status quo-oriented distributive logic, we must look 
back for a moment at how general university funds were allocated to the 
German universities by the federal states before the university reforms began 
in the late 1960s. Until then, a bilateral funding relationship between each 
professor and the state’s ministry of education existed. When a professor got 
an appointment for a chair at a particular university, and afterwards whenever 
he was offered a chair from some other university and had to decide whether 
to stay or to move, he could bargain with the ministry about the general uni-
versity funds that were to be dedicated to him personally. The bargaining 
agreements were binding for the future. The ministry was unable to reduce 
what it had once granted to a professor. Thus, allocation of general university 
funds consisted in a multitude of bilateral binding commitments. It was, there-
fore, highly inflexible in the social as well as in the temporal dimension. A 
redistribution of the general university funds given to a university was only 
possible by allocating increases selectively.
In this traditional funding regime, within a university no collective deci-
sions about the distribution of general university funds were taken. The uni-
versity’s organizational potential for self-governance remained untapped. For 
several reasons not to be dealt with here, government tried to increase the 
universities’ self-govemance by instituting the university reforms. Since then, 
general university funds have been given in a lump sum to the university, 
which has to allocate them internally in two stages. General university funds 
must first be divided among the departments, and then, within each depart-
ment, among the professors. Thus, on the level of the university as a whole 
as well as on the department level, collective decisions regarding distribution
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of funds are required. Universities have thus acquired the authority and the 
responsibility for the internal allocation of their most important resources. 
But, as explained above, this radical institutional change has had almost no 
redistributive effects. There were two reasons for this: the lack of resolve on 
government’s part, and the widespread attitude among the professors that it 
was best to cooperate with one another.
Under the old funding regime of bilateral bargaining, the state’s ministries 
of education had got into a ruinous cycle of outbidding each other in their 
competition for professors. Professors were able to exploit this competition 
and acquire very generous supplies of general university funds for themselves. 
At the end of the 1960s, the joint commission of the states’ ministries of 
education (Kultusministerkonferenz, KMK) made a collective decision to 
restrict this ruinous competition by prohibiting the dedication of general uni-
versity funds to individual professors. This evidently was integrated into the 
new funding regime established shortly thereafter according to which the 
universities themselves had to allocate general university funds internally. 
But the formal renunciation of personal resource dedications was not in tune 
with the ongoing competition for professors between the states. In this compe-
tition, such dedications have remained the most widely used weapons. Under 
the pressure of competition, a lack of resolve prevailed among the states’ 
ministries of education (interview 52). As a consequence, government itself 
has acted contrary to its own intention, which had been to give universities 
a wide area of discretion for redistributive decisions about resources. At most 
universities, a significant amount of the general university funds -  sometimes 
well over half -  are still dedicated to individual professors and, hence, cannot 
be handled any more flexibly than under the old funding regime (interviews 
16, 20, 39, 56).
But even the segment of the general university funds which was at the 
disposal of intrauniversity collective decision was only rarely redistributed. 
Instead, a mutual attitude of cooperativeness among the professors prevailed, 
causing them to refrain from challenging the status quo of resource distribu-
tion as it had emerged from the past. Losses of general university funds as 
well as rare increases were distributed proportionally. In effect, this resulted 
in an implicit mutual non-aggression pact among the professors (interviews 
1, 2, 4, 6, 11, 12, 19, 23, 42, 43, 45). Undoubtedly, most of them suffered 
significantly from the scarcity of general university funds. Moreover, in any 
university everybody knows about certain departments or professors whose
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research productivity is low but who nevertheless have considerable resources 
for research at their disposal. Still, these resources are not taken away from 
them by their colleagues who have a much more legitimate resource demand 
and who would be able to decide collectively on a redistribution of these 
inefficiently allocated resources.
There are several good reasons for professors to act in this way, as odd 
as it may seem at first sight:
1. The conflicts associated with challenging the established distribution of 
resources produce emotional stress, especially on the faculty level where 
one literally meets one’s opponents every day.
2. Most professors are not experienced in organizational micropolitics. So-
cialization as a scientist does not include acquiring such skills, and often 
even breeds a certain contempt for the “dirty tricks” associated with them.
3. Conflicts arising from redistributive efforts destroy the collective influence 
of the department or university needed against enemies outside. In diffi-
cult times when the state ministry of education permanently threatens to 
reduce the general university funds and the universities have to fight for 
additional funds, internal conflicts are clearly out of place.
4. As risk-aversive actors, professors are well-advised to refrain from redis-
tributive initiatives which might trigger future revenge. And even if no 
revenge is taken, establishing redistribution as a possibility of action al-
ways implies that one might be a victim of it oneself some time in the 
future.
5. All these reasons why a professor is better off not pressing for redistribu-
tive resource decisions even if they are to his present advantage have a 
strong basis as long as he sees good chances for himself to acquire the 
resources he needs as separately budgeted funds. By this, he substitutes 
a comparatively comfortable anonymous competition according to scientif-
ic criteria for the politicized face-to-face conflicts within the faculty or 
university.
These five reasons strongly overdetermine a professor’s attitude of coopera-
tiveness toward his colleagues. As long as most professors are motivated by 
at least one of these reasons, this is sufficient to bring about this implicit 
mutual nonaggression pact.
Government’s lack of resolve, produced by the competition for professors 
among the state education ministries, together with the professors’ mutual
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attitude of cooperativeness toward each other arising from one or more of 
the five reasons mentioned above, jointly brought about the nonredistributive 
nature of intrauniversity allocation of general university funds. Thus, scarcity 
of the resources for research from these funds was usually divided evenly 
among professors. Collective decisions about resource allocation made every-
body worse off. It was only under exceptional circumstances that a professor 
had the opportunity to cope with his resource troubles on this level of action. 
Coping, therefore, had to happen on other levels. I will now turn to the level 
of research policy, where government actors and advocates of the universities 
interacted.
2 Mutual Blockade between Government and Advocates of the
Universities
From the beginning of this troublesome situation, there was a clash between 
government and the corporate actors representing the interests of the universi-
ties at the political level. The goals of both sides were mutually exclusive.
The main corporate actors functioning as advocates of the universities 
were the West German Rectors’ Conference (WestdeutscheRektorenkonferenz,
Q
WRK), representing the universities, the DFG mentioned above, and the 
Association of University Professors (Deutscher Hochschulverband, DHV), 
a professional association of professors. In the early 1970s, these advocates 
began to criticize political indifference toward worsening research conditions 
at universities that had resulted from the increased teaching load. The resource 
trouble with all its implications was pointed out again and again. This criti-
cism evolved into demands for far-reaching compensation. Essentially, the 
manifold and varied expressions of the advocates’ opinions boiled down to 
a quite simple recipe. Increases were called for, primarily in the general uni-
versity funds, secondarily in the separately budgeted funds (especially from 
the DFG), so that autonomous research would be possible on a satisfactory 
level for each professor. Obviously, this would have meant huge increases, 8
8 Its new name since 1990 is the University Rectors’ Conference (H ochschulrektorenkon-
feren z, HRK).
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as the advocates were well aware. To give just one recent example: In 1992 
the HRK estimated that about 30,000 additional established posts for scientific 
personnel were needed to restore approximately the situation of the mid-1970s 
(HRK 1992: 14). While conceding readily that this could only be ac-
complished in a medium- and long-term perspective, the HRK left no room 
for doubts about how necessary such an increase was.
Such demands were the coping efforts on the corporate-actor level. The 
advocates of the universities had neither power nor resources of their own 
that could compensate for the worsening of the research conditions. They 
could only articulate the trouble and try to persuade the political actors to 
do something about it. For this purpose, they brought normative arguments 
to bear, pointing out that professors have not only the legal right to perform 
research, but, indeed, an obligation to do so. They also employed utilitarian 
arguments, emphasizing that a highly industrialized, export-dependent high-
tech society like Germany cannot afford to do without university research 
on a large scale.
The Federal Ministry for Research and Technology (Bundesministerium 
für Forschung und Technologie, BMFT) -  which is an important funding 
agency -  and the state education ministries had plans for the universities 
which differed considerably. As early as 1972, it was stated in the Bundes-
bericht Forschung IV, a research policy report issued every four years by the 
federal government, that there were “... still very unclear ideas ... within the 
universities ...” (BMBW 1972: 15, 63-64, translation by the author) about 
their role within a research system planned and guided by government accord-
ing to its new emphasis on “demand-oriented research.”9 One of the two 
important goals of government was to eliminate this lack of clarity. University 
research programs were expected to be oriented more closely than in the past 
toward the types of new knowledge required by firms and institutions in 
government and the private sector. The other important goal was to raise the 
quality of university research. This goal was first expressed by the Science 
Council (Wissenschaftsrat), an advisory board made up of representatives 
from the states and the federal government, and from the universities and the 
research institutes outside the universities. Especially in its proposals made 
in 1979 concerning the research conditions in the universities the Science
9 An expression coined at that time by the federal minister of research and technology, 
Horst Ehmke (translation by the author).
44 Schimank
Council denied that the university funding was inadequate, stating instead that 
there was a significant lack of quality in university research (Wissenschaftsrat 
1979: 17-19). This view was adopted by government.
Both goals, in conjunction with the fiscal restrictions, implied that govern-
ment was not only unwilling, but also unable to fulfill the demands of the 
advocates of universities. Instead of providing a comprehensive compensation 
for the loss of resources which university research had incurred, government 
favored a redistribution of the reduced resources to those professors whose 
work was either of high interest to the government or private sector, or of 
high quality or, preferably, both. Thus, government wanted to make a virtue 
out of necessity: By increasing the competition for scarcer research resources 
among professors, research that was useful for the government or the private 
sector or was of high quality would benefit, while useless and mediocre re-
search would be eliminated. In time, this would bring about an overall trans-
formation of university research, the highly controversial consequence of 
which would be that many professors would cease conducting research alto-
gether for want of resources. This would amount to the factual elimination 
of the traditional German “unity of teaching and research.” One of the reasons 
government tacitly accepted such consequences was because, as a useful side- 
effect, they would make available the additional personnel required for teach-
ing.10 The great majority of professors had to resist these prospects, of 
course, because most of them were highly interested in maintaining their 
research opportunities and only a few could be sure that they might not lose 
them if such measures were taken.
This incompatibility of viewpoints was defused somewhat during the 
second half of the 1980s, but not enough on both sides to allow for effective 
compromises. Government actors came to accept the universities’ claim that 
the resources for research were far too inadequate altogether. As a result, 
some special programs were initiated to alleviate this lack of resources, in-
10 In 1983, Eberhard Boning of the Federal Ministry of Education and Science ([Bundesmini- 
sterium  fü r  B ildung und W issenschaft, BMBW) openly criticized: [W]e are trying
to translate the idea of the unity of research and teaching too perfectionistically from 
the Humboldtian university to today’s university.” He concluded that it would be best 
to “... say farewell to the idea that each professor” can be expected to conduct research 
with consistent intensity throughout his career (Boning 1983: 55-56, translation by the 
author).
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eluding several programs to enable the universities to offer young talented 
researchers at least temporary positions, and 5% annual increases of the 
DFG’s budget for five years. When the states’ ministries of education together 
with their ministries of finance did finally admit in the early 1990s that the 
universities’ demands for strongly increased general funds were basically 
justified, they did not hesitate at the same time to make it quite clear that the 
states’ financial capacities were overtaxed and that the federal government 
would have to step in and take action. But the federal government’s finances 
were also very limited because it had to pay the biggest share of the huge 
costs of German reunification. Only Baden-Württemberg, a relatively pros-
perous state, was able to implement a special program for an improvement 
of its universities’ general funds {Stuttgarter Zeitung, 21 November 1991). 
Financial scarcity, thus, severely restricted the government’s ability to com-
pensate.
Turning to the other side, we find that some advocates of the universities 
also cautiously began to adopt government’s concerns about the performance 
deficits of university research. As early as 1977, for instance, Werner Knopp, 
the president of the WRK, had proclaimed that in future only qualified univer-
sity research could and should be preserved. He came to the conclusion that 
traditional claims for resources had “... to be reflected critically -  even self-
critically...”: “What is necessary here is the courage to differentiate according 
to the criterion of quality” (Knopp 1978: 39-40, translation by the author). 
In the debates about the necessity to intensify competition for resources be-
tween universities and between professors which started in the early 1980s, 
there were also some voices from the universities signalling partial approval 
of government’s point of view. For example, the new president of the WRK, 
Theodor Berchem, declared in 1983: “We will have to ask how to distinguish 
good research from bad, and how to react adequately to this distinction” 
(WRK 1983: 56). But these had to remain lip-services paid to government 
by the advocates of the universities or by individual professors. The universi-
ties were unable to live up to such promises because, as shown above, collec-
tive decisions within the universities about the allocation of general university 
funds refrained from the redistributions which would have been necessary 
to promote research of high quality and of high economical or political useful-
ness.
Therefore, the constellation of government actors and advocates of the 
universities resulted in a mutual blockade. For fulfillment of their demands,
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the advocates of the universities depended on government actors. But these 
actors were unwilling and unable to provide comprehensive compensation 
for the resource losses to university research caused by the increasing con-
sumption of general university funds by teaching. In order to realize their 
goals of improving the quality and societal usefulness of university research, 
however, government actors also depended on the universities. In order to 
serve as implementation agents for these goals of research policy, and to 
redistribute resources internally, the universities would have had to have a 
capacity for self-governance they in fact lacked: they therefore blocked gov-
ernment’s efforts. Thus, on the political level of action, both sides increasingly 
frustrated each other.
The outcome of these coping efforts on the political level shaped the situa-
tions of individual professors. Since their advocates failed to obtain a far- 
reaching compensation for their worsening research conditions, the professors 
had to rely on individualistic coping efforts. Each one of them was forced 
to try to take care of himself.
3 Competition among Individual Professors for Separately 
Budgeted Funds
For a large majority of professors, general university funds were not sufficient 
as resources for their research activities. 83% of all professors declared in 
1990/91 that they needed separately budgeted funds for their research. Only 
17% stated that the availability of separately budgeted funds was not an im-
portant prerequisite for their research work (Schimank 1992: 28-29). This 
small group consisted of three subgroups of professors: those whose general 
funds were sufficient for their research activities, those whose inability to 
cope with an increasing teaching load forced them to give up research alto-
gether, and those who were indifferent to research.
The first of these subgroups deserves a closer look here. It was composed 
mainly of professors in academic fields where research requires relatively 
small financial resources. Typical fields for such “armchair research” which 
usually needed nothing but a good library were mathematics (interview 1), 
philosophy (interview 15), the legal sciences (interview 47), and even some 
parts of the engineering sciences (interview 2). These professors sometimes
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asked private foundations or firms for donations to compensate for the declin-
ing general university funds for their library or for travel costs. This was all 
they needed in addition to their general funds. Even in these academic fields, 
however, changes in the way research was conducted often made research 
more resource-demanding. In mathematics, for example, additional resources 
became necessary, though still on a comparatively low level, for computer 
facilities which opened up new ways to solve theoretical problems (interview 
1). In many academic fields, as the expenditures for equipment and personnel 
required for empirical research grew hand in hand with progress made in 
developing new theories, the niches for inexpensive research became increas-
ingly rare.
In some academic fields, however, professors could at least alternate 
between doing resource-intensive research or less expensive research. In ar-
cheology, for example (interview 4), one branch of research is philologically 
oriented, while another involves costly excavations. Professors with such an 
alternative had an escape route when resources became scarce. But all in all, 
only very few professors were in such lucky circumstances. This reflects the 
path-dependency of individual research careers which, as scientific specializa-
tion increases, sharply narrows down the options remaining open for research-
ers. A researcher who is on a certain track of research has usually invested 
so much time and effort in mastering this track’s difficulties that he will think 
twice before switching tracks and starting anew.
The need for separately budgeted funds in addition to the general universi-
ty funds varied also with a professor’s bargaining position when he was ap-
pointed to his professorship or, later, when he got an offer from another uni-
versity (interviews 1, 46, 47). Professors endowed with plentiful resources, 
either by good luck or because they were excellent researchers who could 
demand such a resource base, were less pressed by resource trouble than 
others. On the other hand, in many academic fields a professor’s proven 
ability to acquire separately budgeted funds had gradually become an impor-
tant criterion for the respective faculty’s recommendation to appoint him to 
the professorship in the first place (interview 24). This points to the fact 
described above that for most of the professors separately budgeted funds had 
become absolutely necessary for their research. The general university funds 
were especially scarce with regard to capital expenditures so that professors 
had to pay the costs for new research facilities or for necessary repairs from 
separately budgeted funds. This sometimes even resulted in alibi projects
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whose only covert purpose was to get certain types of equipment (interviews 
20, 23, 40).
The sources of separately budgeted funds had diversified since the mid- 
1970s (Schimank 1992: 27-28). Private foundations, newly established pools 
for separately budgeted funds on the state level, and the European Community 
(EC) became increasingly important. Still, the DFG remained the most impor-
tant distributor of these funds in all academic fields. There is no other funding 
agency without any restrictions for the subjects of proposals. Thus, the DFG 
is the only source of separately budgeted funds for those professors whose 
research topics do not fit into the programs of any of the other funding agen-
cies. Quantitatively, second to the DFG was the BMFT, whose research pro-
motion is concentrated in the natural sciences, engineering, and medicine. 
Unfortunately, these two “big spenders” experienced the highest scarcity of 
funds. The DFG not only had to suffer, as already mentioned, a dramatic 
decline of the proportion of grants applications it was able to fund. Addition-
ally, in certain years even money already granted to professors had to be cut 
back. The BMFT, which was often criticized for concentrating its research 
promotion too much on a few technological fields like nuclear energy and 
space technology while neglecting many other promising fields (interview 
20), had to cut back spending, especially in these other fields, because it had 
to fulfill huge long-term commitments in nuclear and space research.
The professors who needed separately budgeted funds individually tried 
to cope with this situation in four ways. Firstly, professors still applied for 
funds at the DFG and BMFT, but increased their efforts, either by writing 
more than one research proposal at a time instead of just one, hoping that 
at least one would be granted (interviews 18, 19, 20, 22, 40, 43), or by writ-
ing more carefully argued and extensive proposals, hoping that these would 
be more persuasive (interview 16). Both practices were time-consuming, and 
became even more so because the periods for which funds were granted were 
reduced by DFG and BMFT as a reaction to their scarcity of resources. This 
meant that, as one professor put it, he now wrote four grants proposals a year 
while some years ago he had written one every two years (interview 21).
To diversify one’s sources of separately budgeted funds beyond the DFG 
and the BMFT was a second way of coping with scarcer resources from these 
two most important funding agencies. The private foundations, which were 
especially important for the social sciences and humanities and for the medi-
cal sciences, were one source which could partially make up for the decrease
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in separately budgeted funds from DFG and BMFT. Another source were the 
pools for separately budgeted funds at the ministries for research which were 
founded in several states during the 1980s. Since the end of the 1980s, the 
BMFT in particular pointed to the EC as a source of separately budgeted 
funds to which German universities had paid too little attention, compared 
to universities from other EC member countries (Wissenschaftsrat 1988: 46-
52). The main reason for this, however, was that German professors did not 
need the EC as an additional funding agency as long as the funds from other 
funding agencies sufficed. When this was no longer the case, they were re-
ferred to the EC, but without adequate information about programs of research 
promotion and application procedures; standing outside the informal circles 
of EC clients, German professors found this to be a very hard road (interviews 
17,20, 25, 39, 43). Moreover, the realization that the EC would only be able 
to grant less than one fifth of the total money applied for along with the very 
complicated application procedures discouraged German professors from 
submitting applications. The frequent partitioning of projects into many short 
segments, each requiring a new application, was also a deterrent, as was the 
belief that scientific quality as a criterion in grants decisions was often super-
seded by regional considerations in favor of South European countries.
Another attractive source of additional separately budgeted funds was con-
tract research for firms or government agencies. Ranging from small studies 
to large-scale projects, contract research had a long tradition in many fields 
of science. The fields of engineering, agricultural sciences and medicine were 
most likely to be engaged in this type of research. Due to the scarcity of 
resources available for research from the general university funds and the 
increasing difficulties encountered in trying to acquire separately budgeted 
funds from other sources, many professors in these fields were forced to 
intensify contract research; others who had shunned this type of research 
altogether up to this point had no choice but to begin conducting it (inter-
views 1, 3, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 40).
A third way to partially cope with the decline of separately budgeted 
funds from DFG and BMFT was to intensify research cooperation with certain 
government-financed research institutes outside of the universities, especially 
with institutes of the Max Planck Society (Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, MPG) 
and big science centers. This cooperation was called for frequently by the 
WRK. As early as 1977, a resolution was formulated by WRK and MPG 
concerning the desirability of a further increase of research cooperation. Simi-
50 Schimank
lar joint proposals were made by the WRK and the association of big science 
centers. Quite recently, in 1991, the Science Council documented the present 
state of the cooperation between universities and big science centers and 
recommended a number of improvements (Wissenschaftsrat 1991). Such 
cooperation was especially interesting for professors because these research 
institutes outside of the universities usually had much better research facilities. 
Thus, research cooperation frequently meant nothing more than being allowed 
to participate in the use of these facilities (interviews 20, 23). The genuinely 
cooperative research activities that did occur tended to date back to a time 
when professors were not being nudged toward cooperation by resource trou-
ble (interview 12).
A fourth way of coping with resource trouble was to increase the use of 
students as an extension of a professor’s research staff. In many fields of the 
natural, engineering, and agricultural sciences, it had become quite common 
for students writing their final thesis to select their topic from lists compiled 
by the professors, reflecting the latter’s research interests (interviews 1, 12, 
16, 38).11 Often research consists mainly of extensive experimental work 
within the framework of a theory which is finished in general and has to be 
worked out in detail; advanced students are competent to do this routinized 
research and to deliver useful contributions to a professor’s research program. 
These are frequently very time-consuming research activities requiring neither 
the theoretical creativity nor the extensive knowledge of the field which only 
an experienced researcher possesses. The students’ tasks consist mainly of 
developing experimental designs and, later, observing and measuring the 
processes. This is perhaps best exemplified by chemistry, where a particular 
research problem is often attacked simultaneously from different approaches, 
each assigned to one researcher within a professor’s group; some of these 
researchers will be advanced students working on their thesis. In contrast, 
many research problems in theoretical physics are too difficult or too complex 
to be distributed among advanced students, so that in this field such a cou-
pling of research and teaching was not possible (interview 43).
Of these four ways of coping with the resource trouble, the third was 
available only to very few professors, and the fourth could only yield margin-
al improvements. Thus, the first two ways were by far the most important.
11 See the extensive empirical study analyzing this situation at the beginning of the 1970s 
by Wilhelm (1978).
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Both of them resulted in an increased competition among professors which 
forced them to intensify their efforts to acquire separately budgeted funds. 
These efforts consisted not only of writing grant proposals, but also of mani-
fold activities of social networking with influential colleagues or officials 
from the funding agencies. The success of these efforts, however, became 
less likely because the demand for separately budgeted funds increased stron-
ger than the supply; and even if a professor was successful, he was usually 
granted a smaller amount of resources for a shorter period of time. In other 
words, an increase of invested efforts corresponded with a decreasing return 
on the investment. In addition, no professor knew how much effort others 
were investing. This mutual ignorance between competitors motivated each 
one to redouble his efforts. For a risk-aversive actor, this is a rational way 
of acting under such circumstances. Applying for separately budgeted funds 
was like bidding at an auction where one does not know how much one’s 
competitors are bidding. If one is desperately in need of separately budgeted 
funds, investing as much effort as possible maximizes one’s chances for suc-
cess. But such individually rational action results in collectively undesirable, 
ruinous competition. The mutual pressure between professors brought about 
increased standards for successful applications, which was against everybody’s 
interest because it required even more effort. Thus, if the professors could 
have committed themselves to not to try to beat each other by perfecting grant 
applications and cultivating good connections, this would have been helpful 
to everybody. Everybody then would have had more time to actually conduct 
research, instead of having to spend time acquiring resources for research.
The situation was a Prisoner’s Dilemma (Colman 1982: 101-104, 113-136) 
where no professor could be sure that all others would refrain from trying 
to get a competitive advantage. But if one must anticipate that some, at least, 
will defect from a collective self-restraint, it is better to be one of the defec-
tors. With everyone taking this into account, the escalation of competition 
which harms everyone begins to take its inevitable course. This dynamic was 
accelerated by two differences between the professors:12 Those in greatest 
need of separately budgeted funds were more likely to start the race than 
others, as were those who -  rightly or wrongly -  felt they had good chances 
of winning such a race. As a consequence, professors became “professional
12 These differences are “threshold levels” in Mark Granovetter’s sense (Granovetter 1978).
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application writers,” as one of them concisely expressed it (interview 18), 
finding correspondingly less time for genuine research work.
Thus, individual coping efforts resulted in increasing collective frustration. 
A growing number of professors were unable to keep pace with the intellectu-
al and social efforts necessary to apply successfully for separately budgeted 
funds, and those who did keep pace found themselves devoting more and 
more energy to an intrinsically unsatisfactory activity.
4 An Incremental Way Out of a Self-Replicating -  and 
Unsatisfactory -  Coping Pattern
As my analysis up to this point shows, the pattern of coping activities on the 
three levels of action was a stable equilibrium. It reproduced itself again and 
again because none of the actors involved was able to improve his situation 
unilaterally. More precisely, the equilibrium of the constellations of actors 
on the level of intrauniversity allocation of general university funds strongly 
determined the equilibria on the other two levels. Because an implicit nonag-
gression pact between the professors on the middle level prevented redistribu-
tions of general university funds, a mutual blockade between state ministries 
and advocates of the universities ensued on the political level. This, in turn, 
increased the demand for separately budgeted funds on the level of individual 
professors, which in turn brought about an intensified competition between 
professors.
This three-level equilibrium was unsatisfactory for almost all of the actors 
involved. Government actors, on the one hand, did not succeed at increasing 
the universities’ research performance either with respect to intrascientific 
quality or with respect to extrascientific utility. A majority of professors, on 
the other hand, suffered from resource trouble because their individual coping 
efforts could at best reduce, but not totally compensate for, their losses. In 
addition, professors had to make the efforts necessary for coping. Thus, pro-
fessors were worse off than before the trouble started; and government actors 
could not achieve the strongly desired improvements. But whereas professors 
had no chance to get out of this unsatisfactory equilibrium, government actors 
did have an option for at least a small, slow way out. They began to take 
advantage of this opportunity in the mid-1980s.
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Government’s option amounted in effect to bypassing the obstruction of 
redistribution that prevailed in the intrauniversity allocation of general univer-
sity funds. Whenever resources became available, government actors were 
able to distribute them according to their own discretion. Although the total 
amount of resources did not grow during the period under consideration and 
no additional resources therefore became available for redistribution, resources 
which had been dedicated to a professor did become available on a small 
scale whenever that professor left his post, either to retire or to take on a new 
job. While taking away a vacant professorship from a department or a uni-
versity, including the finances and the established posts attached to that pro-
fessorship, does cause conflicts, it is relatively easy. First of all, there is no 
one occupying the chair who can claim any specific rights to it. Secondly, 
although a department or a university usually tries to preserve its resource 
base, if it is forced to give up some of it, it will tend to choose resources 
which do not belong to anyone at the moment.
Since professorships became vacant from time to time, the states’ minis-
tries of education were able to collect up these unclaimed resources and redis-
tribute them. This occurred sporadically until the mid-1980s, when ministries 
of education in several states, seeing an opportunity to further their research- 
policy goals, started systematically redistributing resources by building up 
special discretionary pools of general funds (Wissenschaftsrat 1988: 43- 
46).13 Baden-Württemberg was the forerunner (Stuttgarter Zeitung, 22 July 
1987), with others like North Rhine-Westphalia soon following suit (inter-
views 52, 54). Resources from these pools were mostly used to reward high- 
quality research and to make new high-quality research possible. For example, 
when a group of professors acquired a special research area (Sonderfor-
schungsbereicht) from the DFG, it meant they had proven the quality of their 
research activities. Hence, they could get additional general funds from the 
special discretionary pool of the state’s ministry of education. An additional 
criterion for the assignment of these resources was the promotion of research 
considered to be economically or politically useful. Informatics profited espe-
cially from this redistribution (interviews 43, 45, 52) as did fields such as
13 A little earlier, in 1979, the Science Council had advised the states to instruct the univer-
sities to build up central pools of general funds w ith in  each university (Wissenschaftsrat 
1979: 20-29). The states’ ministries of education seldom followed this advice, assuming 
-  correctly -  that the universities would be unable to significantly redistribute these 
resources (Wissenschaftsrat 1988: 46).
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biotechnology or material sciences, while the humanities and many fields of 
the social sciences suffered.
Obviously, this very slow, piecemeal approach to gathering resources for 
redistribution could seldom keep pace with the amount of resources required 
for accomplishing far-reaching political goals at any given moment. At 
the beginning of the 1990s, the total amount of separately budgeted funds 
acquired by the universities in North Rhine-Westphalia, for example, was 
about twenty times higher than these discretionary funds from the ministry; 
using the special pools for established posts, the ministry could redistribute 
no more than 40 to 60 posts annually, and only one third of these could actu-
ally be redistributed according to priorities of research policy (interview 52). 
Thus, these resources from the special pools could at best reinforce certain 
developments whose impetus came from somewhere else, or sometimes cata-
lyze such developments. But this was the only escape route government could 
take from the blockade described above. At least government was able to 
redistribute about 15% of the universities’ established posts for personnel 
between 1975 and 1990 -  an average of 1% annually. While this may seem 
to be a very small amount, it is three times the amount the universities them-
selves were able to redistribute.14 5
It seems safe to predict that other states will try to take this route on an 
extended scope during the coming years. As of the mid-1990s, the political 
room to maneuver in this respect will expand considerably for several years 
because many professors will retire. Some observers, like the HRK, even 
expect that government will use this opportunity to eliminate permanent per-
14 A lucky coincidence could be exploited politically in Baden-Württemberg (S tu ttgarter  
Zeitung, 23 November 1991). According to general orders from the state’s ministry of 
finance, all ministries were called upon to reduce their budgets for several years as of 
the end of the 1980s, in 1990 and 1991 by 5% each year. For the universities this meant 
a proportional reduction of the general university funds from the ministry of education. 
It so happened that this ministry initiated special programs for the universities during 
this same period. The funds it mobilized to do this were part of the very money it had 
been forced to cut. Now, the education ministry was able to distribute these resources 
according to its own priorities. Thus, the ministry of finance unintentionally did for the 
ministry of education what the latter would hardly have been able to accomplish on its 
own.
15 These data are from an internal survey of the HRK (see also D eu tsch e  U n iversitä ts-
zeitu ng  1991(4): 7).
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sonal dedications of general university funds and, instead, establish dedica-
tions which last for a specified number of years and can be renewed only 
after a successful passing of a personal evaluation of one’s research perfor-
mance (interview 55). If this really happens, government will have consider-
ably more discretionary power in distributing general university funds, and 
its political guidance capacity with respect to university research will increase 
significantly. Thus, a slow, incremental shift of the still predominant equilibri-
um into a direction more favorable to government’s research-policy goals has 
already begun and will probably pick up speed in the near future.
This change will surely be accompanied by growing conflicts with facul-
ties and universities. But not all professors were and will be against this gov-
ernment policy. Professors with a high intra- or extrascientific reputation for 
their research performance will be at an advantage. Over time, government 
might establish a tacit coalition of interests with them. The redistributive 
measures of government will probably exacerbate the resource trouble faced 
by the rest of the professors while providing good opportunities for the pro-
fessors with outstanding performance records.
5 Effects on University Research
Turning back again from speculations about the future to the existing resource 
trouble and the pattern of coping reactions, I will now briefly sketch some 
of the effects these developments had on university research.
To begin with the most general finding, 32% of all professors claimed 
in 1990/91 that their chances of acquiring separately budgeted funds had de-
creased during the preceding years; 35% said their chances of acquiring such 
funds had remained the same, while 16% said their chances had even im-
proved.16 This is, clearly, a mixed picture. About one third of all professors 
suffered from resource troubles without being able to cope with them success-
fully. The other two thirds either coped successfully with this kind of trouble 
or had no need to cope because they were undisturbed by it. This indicates 
that the damage done to university research by the shrinking of general uni-
16 For the remaining 17%, separately budgeted funds were not an important determinant 
of their research activities.
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versity funds remained limited -  partly because individual coping activities 
were sometimes reinforced by research policy.
Lacking appropriate data, one cannot say anything definitive about wheth-
er the overall volume of university research has declined. But it may very 
well be that in this respect nothing significant has happened yet. And even 
if the universities’ quantitative research capacity has been reduced to some 
extent, this may in effect turn out to be a blessing in disguise. As long as 
mediocre or even bad research is being weeded out, the resource trouble can 
be said to have spawned a prudent consolidation of the research system.
Effects of the resource trouble which can more clearly be categorized as 
harmful relate to certain qualitative dimensions of university research. At least 
four possibly harmful effects on research quality can be distinguished. The 
first concerns the implications arising from the fact that the increasing efforts 
necessary to acquire separately budgeted funds kept professors from doing 
research work themselves and left them with less time to supervise their 
assistants’ research work. As mentioned above, professors were forced to 
spend more and more time writing grant applications and had to pass the 
research work on to their assistants, who were often comparatively inexpe-
rienced. As a consequence, the assistants’ work may not have been as efficient 
as the professors’ would have been, and may sometimes have lacked the inge-
nuity which could have been contributed by extremely innovative professors.
A second harmful effect resulted from the shorter terms of the research 
projects and the diminishing chances of getting follow-up projects, which 
meant that many professors had significant problems maintaining their re-
search staff (interviews 20, 22, 23). Often, research assistants had to be dis-
missed just when they had finally gathered some research experience. Thus, 
professors repeatedly had to make fresh starts with new, inexperienced staff. 
The increased turnover of research assistants was not only detrimental to the 
continuity of research work, but also demotivated the assistants themselves 
and lowered the quality of their performance. Moreover, as the time allotted 
to the research projects was reduced, many investigations were left incomplete 
because the scientists had to start completely new projects when they applied 
for new grants (interviews 19, 20, 23).
Thirdly, the professors who coped with their resource trouble by doing 
more contract research often suffered harsh consequences in the form of a 17
17 See also Kaddatz (1987), who interprets this as a general tendency.
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significant loss of their research autonomy. Doing contract research was nec-
essary for many professors not only to be able to support their research staff, 
but also to be able to buy and repair very expensive research equipment (in-
terviews 1 ,3 ,20,23,40). Contract research was often noninnovative, routine 
work, and the professors were sometimes exploited by the firms as cheap 
R&D consultants (interview 19). Professors had to suffer with changes of 
priorities of research topics coming from the firms or government agencies 
that could be sudden and erratic (interviews 19, 23); they also had to bear 
with restrictions on their rights to publish their research results and with very 
short deadlines for projects, which meant that they were repeatedly forced 
to go on to the next subject before a thorough analysis of the research results 
could be completed (interview 19). By informal agreement, the routine work 
entailed in a research contract was occasionally done by an advanced student 
who could use it as his graduate thesis, while the theoretically interesting 
aspects were sometimes dealt with by one of the doctoral candidates (inter-
view 23). Nevertheless, even under comparatively favorable circumstances, 
the necessity to accept one research contract after another, for fear of other-
wise being driven out of this market and missing out on potentially important 
future options, remained, pushing self-determined research alternatives aside. 
Professors saw clearly that, in time, this might result in their losing the ability 
to keep pace with scientific progress in their academic field (interviews 3, 
19,22,23). Some of them therefore classified contract research as being their 
last resort, as the high-risk step of “prostituting oneself’ -  as one professor 
drastically put it (interview 39) -  if there was no other way to survive as a 
researcher (interview 12, 16). Government policies aimed at the promotion 
of transfer-oriented research sometimes reinforced such deleterious tendencies.
Fourthly, it might be suspected that the resource trouble drove out uncon-
ventional, risky research approaches in favor of middle-of-the-road re-
search.18 This seems probable because the research orthodoxy is usually 
well represented in the peer-review committees which determine who gets 
separately budgeted funds for which kind of research. The research establish-
ment serves itself first. As long as comparatively plentiful resources are avail-
able, there still remains a significant amount for outsiders and newcomers. 
But if resources become more scarce, even adherents to the established ortho-
18 A tendency Dietmar Braun also identifies in his case study of biomedical research in 
Great Britain and the United States (in this volume).
58 Schimank
doxy have more difficulties acquiring the resources they need: They become 
more determined than ever to protect their claims against invaders. Being able 
to legitimize this by the supposed cognitive superiority of their established 
theoretical positions reinforces this tendency even more. In the long run, 
however, this eliminates important opportunities for radical innovations in 
science and, in fact, increases the danger that the orthodoxy will run into a 
blind alley sooner or later. Because “... progress can occur along unlikely and 
deviant paths ...,” it is essential that "... space ... be left for the individual 
variants of knowledge to grow and mature ...” (Nowotny 1989: 342).
The problem with all of these harmful tendencies is not so much that they 
have already grown to dangerous proportions. We do not know for sure if 
this is the case. The real problem, rather, is that there are no alarm signals 
to warn us about these tendencies, and no emergency brakes to bring them 
to a halt. These tendencies can continue for a long time without the damage 
becoming visible. What does it mean for research and for society at large if 
the most outstanding researchers are worn down by resource acquisition and 
research is conducted by largely unsupervised, relatively inexperienced staff? 
How harmful is it if many research projects have to be stopped half way? 
What happens if university research becomes streamlined according to narrow 
and short-term extrascientific priorities? Where are we headed if research 
orthodoxy is allowed to reign virtually undisputed? The answers will only 
become evident in the long run -  and this may very well be too late.
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